Brazil: a cordial power?
Brazilian diplomacy in the early 21st century

DOI: 10.3395/recis.v4i1.344en

Abstract
Brazilian foreign policy and its diplomacy saw a significant advance in its concepts, instruments and practices in the early 21st century, which corresponds to a new standard in the country’s international insertion, an apparently positive response in the new globalization phase and characterized by cordiality. Brazilian international relations during this period underwent at least four great changes: greater emphasis on the internationalization of Brazilian companies, diversification of the country’s international ties, stronger action in international organisms and adoption of the non-indifference principle. On the whole, along with other elements, Brazilian foreign policy reveals the exercise of a power’s policy, without incorporating values and elements of classical realism and neorealism. It is the construction of a cordial power, ostensibly cooperative and modern on the international plane, however incapable of overcoming its internal maladies.

Keywords
international relations; Brazilian foreign policy; international cooperation; power; non-indifference

Can a power be cordial? Realist literature about international relations would not hesitate to answer that question negatively. Classical realism has consolidated as the sources of power – and the basis for constructing the power – a country’s economic resources, its armed forces and its capacity to form an opinion or, in other words, to construct a political-ideological framework and establish consensus through it (CARR, 2001). Neorealism, while it recognizes the importance of other actors on the international stage, such as companies, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and even individuals, remains close to its origin, that is, the state as the main player in the international game and military and economic strength as its main weapons. Cordiality is well-viewed in the daily exercise of diplomacy, but it’s far from representing a relevant power resource.

The pluralist perspectives recognize the existence of various actors, value public international law and the pacta sunt servanda principle, as well as considering multilateralism to be the path that can lead international relations to a superior level of dialogue, with rules which are accepted by all. Cordiality, in this case, is an important element in diplomatic exercise, with the capacity to make negotiations more dynamic, however based on a previously-existing convergence. In Rosenau’s (2000) view, convergence occurs around rules, procedures and international agreements that have been consensually established by two or more states, which makes it possible to talk about global governance. Governance is a broader phenomenon than government, including governmental institutions and informal mechanisms:

Governance is an ordination system that only works when it is accepted by the majority (or at least by the most powerful actors in its universe), while governments can function even in the face of broad opposition to their policy. (…) Therefore, it is possible to talk about governance without a government – without regulatory mechanisms in a sphere of activity that effectively
functions even when it is not endorsed by a formal authority (ROSENAU, 2000, p. 16).

The reference for accepting a majority-based ordination system certainly includes cordiality, but this is not a pre-requisite for the system as, in this perspective, conflict of interests is an integrating part of the system and includes non-cordial attitudes. This way of interpreting cordiality in the diplomatic area is equally present in the constructivist view of international relations.

Alexander Wendt, an advocate of the constructivist current, defined this theoretical perspective as a structural theory of the international system, with the following characteristics: the states must be the main unit of analysis of the international system; the key structures in the state-based system are more intersubjective than material; and the states’ interests and identities are constructed by the social structures, by human nature and by domestic policy (WENDT, 1994). In his view, what matters are not facts such as the distribution of material wealth among states and rather its interpretation and the meaning attributed by the agents themselves. If we apply these ideas to Brazilian foreign policy, we can say that the Brazilian worldview and the traditional values of its foreign policy strongly influence the country’s current directives, which is not exclusive to Brazil. This tie is shared by the most diverse nations, including the United States of America.

American foreign policy has fed on – and continues to feed on – what some theorists call soft power, Washington leaders’ capacity to build consensus on the international plane and which is directly linked to the Gramscian concept of hegemony.

(...) the universality of a country’s culture and its capacity to establish a set of favorable norms and institutions that govern sectors of international activity are decisive sources of power. The values of democracy, personal freedom, social mobility and opening, frequently expressed in American popular culture, higher education and foreign policy contribute to our country’s power in many areas (NYE JR, 2002, p. 37).

American soft power is not to be confused with Brazilian diplomacy’s cordiality as, apart from its greater scope, it is recognized as a source of power and systematically applied in international negotiations. In other words, American culture is a constituting part of its commercial policy, its investments and its armed interventions. Brazilian cordiality, on the other hand, is linked more to a way of conducting foreign policy than to an essence. Cordiality, however, does not just mean good manners and affable treatment.

This calls to mind Sérgio Buarque de Holanda’s classic Raízes do Brasil (Brazilian Roots), a work in which he tackled the theme of Brazilian cordiality – applied not to the country’s international relations, but to its social and political practices. To Holanda, the cordial man acts on the basis of the feelings which spring directly from his heart, without the mediation of rationality, treating friends and foes differently and restricting the space for abstract norms and rules to function. In this sense, cordiality conspires against bureaucracy and democracy (WEGNER, 2009, p. 217).

It would be unfair to accuse Brazilian diplomacy and foreign policy directives of acting against the values and rules of democracy, partly because on this point the notion of cordiality applied to foreign policy distances itself from Sérgio Buarque de Holanda. The Brazilian chancellery prizes technical competence, international dialogue and its forums. However, it must be recognized that both Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s presidential diplomacy and Luís Inácio Lula da Silva’s personalism sought informal dialogue, fluid personal relationships with great international authorities and diplomatic discourse that was sympathetic to social, environmental and peace causes. This behavior – perhaps more motivated by passion than reason – covers up some of the great contradictions of Brazilian foreign policy: a signatory of the most important international legal instruments for the defense of human rights, environmental protection, the fight against international crime and the defense of peaceful solutions to controversies, presents extreme obstacles in the sense of resolving, internally, human rights violations, environmental aggressions and the fight against arms and drug trafficking, for example.

Although some advances can be seen in these areas, from the internal political point of view, the path to be traveled is long and tortuous. On the other hand, Brazilian foreign policy, under the Lula da Silva administration, has been showing aggressiveness in areas such as WTO negotiations, opposition to the FTAA (which has practically been forgotten) and the search for market diversification and promotion of Brazilian companies abroad. Could cordiality, in this sense, be an essential part of a Brazilian soft power, sustaining the country’s greater international projection over the last few years? The purpose of this text is to try to give a preliminary answer to this and other questions linked to the action of Brazilian diplomacy in the current administration.
Accumulated history and cordiality

The concept of *accumulated history*, applied to Brazilian foreign policy, was developed by Amado Luiz Cervo in the book he organized, *O desafio internacional* (CERVO, 1994). After explaining that in the area of Brazilian international relations there is thought without theory, that is, differently from in English or American academia, in Brazil we have not theorized international relations, which is not in itself a negative element, Cervo sought to explain the principles and values, inherent to foreign policy, which form a certain standard of behavior in the conduct of Brazilian diplomacy. As part of the accumulated history of Brazilian foreign policy he identified pacifism, legalism, realism (which, with time, became pragmatism) and economic development as its direction.

The standards of behavior in Brazilian diplomacy fulfill at least two functions: they make foreign action predictable and mold governments’ external policies, influencing their succession and even a change of political regime. When the accumulated history of Brazilian foreign policy was updated, nine elements were identified, namely: a) self-determination, non-intervention and peaceful solution of controversies; b) legalism; c) normative multilateralism; d) cooperative and non-confrontational external action; e) strategic partnerships; f) realism and pragmatism; g) official cordiality in the treatment of neighbors; h) development as a direction; i) independence of international insertion (CERVO, 2008, p. 26-31).

Among the elements of Brazilian accumulated history that approach the notion of cordiality are the peaceful solution of controversy, cooperative and non-confrontational external action and official cordiality in the treatment of neighbors. Sustained by Brazilian society’s pacifism, the peaceful solution of controversies is related to the coexistence of differences in Brazilian society, which suggests coexistence between nations of different cultures. Cooperative and non-confrontational external action has as its history the “Western alignment” that occurred at the time of the two great wars and as its principle the conviction that international cooperation is the best path for economic and technological development. Non-confrontation is historically evidenced in the relations between Brazil and the United States, which may occasionally present moments of tension and conflict, but never confrontation. As for cordiality in the treatment of neighbors, according to Cervo, it is a standard of behavior that was conceived in the 19th century by the Viscount and, in the 20th century, the Baron of Rio Branco, linked to the idea of friendship implementation and business development as instruments for maintaining peace.

Official cordiality recommends a regional conduct that doesn’t flaunt national greatness and economic superiority and that eliminates gestures of prestige, but is guided by the fulfillment of Brazilian interests over its neighbors’, whether through cooperation or negotiation, and strengthens its international power, reasons that may momentarily break cordiality. The break is not recommendable, for this reason the Lula administration refused to enter a conflict with its Argentine and Bolivian counterparts, Nestor Kirchner and Evo Morales, when external commerce interests and Brazilian investments were affected (CERVO, 2008, p. 30).

Cordiality in the treatment of neighbors, essentially sustained by the achievement of the country’s long-term objectives, can also be applied to Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela, an object of great discussion in Brazilian society and parliament. Those who limit themselves to highlighting authoritarian elements in Hugo Chavez’s government and who ask for a distancing from Venezuela ignore not only the excellent results Brazil has obtained with that country, both on the commercial plane and in direct investments, but also the fact that distancing would bring nothing positive. Official cordiality avoids unnecessary wear and tear for Brazilian diplomacy and allows greater attention to be given to negotiating substantial points of agreements.

There is, therefore, a cordiality present in relations with neighbors which extends, in specific situations, to the peaceful solution of controversy and to cooperative and non-confrontational external action. It is official cordiality. Could there be, along with the latter, other manifestations of cordiality, more linked to the heart’s impulse than to strategic calculation?

Unsympathetic views of the Lula da Silva administration and its foreign policy were already present in the first years of government. One of the main criticisms was directed at the search for new strategic partnerships or at least the way in which the foreign relations ministry was guiding it. Faced with the difficulties of advancing, internally, his government programmes, Lula da Silva supposedly transferred to foreign policy the role of giving the government credibility, taking advantage of the fusion of his *presidential bonhomie* with Foreign Affairs Minister Celso Amorim’s *professionalism*. When President Lula spoke about the opening of great business opportunities as a result of the almost automatic strategic partnerships with Russia, India and China, the critics answered that little attention had been given to business with the United States. According to ambassador Rubem
Barbosa, one of the main critics of the Lula administration’s foreign policy, there is concern regarding the future of the relationship [with the United States], due to a perception of the ‘unpredictability’ of Brazilian actions when compared to that of other countries – traditional, but predictable – which are ‘opponents’ of the USA, such as Russia, India and China (Primeira Leitura, no.29, July 2004).

This criticism continues today and reveals itself on certain occasions, as with the debate in the Brazilian parliament about Venezuela’s entry in Mercosur or the trip that Iran’s president – Mahmud Ahmadinejad – made to Brazil, in November 2009, an occasion when Lula defended the Iranian right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes. In Celso Amorim’s view, Brazil is only exercising its right to dialogue with the most diverse countries in the world, independently of any difficulties the United States and others may have in dialoguing with these countries.

The cordiality present in the dialogue with Russia and China, Venezuela and Bolivia, Iran and Israel must not be confused with ineptitude, willfulness or naiveté, as it is related to traditions of Brazilian society and policy present in the country’s constitution. It must be remembered that Article 4 of the federal constitution establishes the following guiding principles for Brazil’s international relations: national independence, prevalence of human rights, self-determination of peoples, non-intervention, equality among states, defense of peace, peaceful conflict resolution, rejection of terrorism and racism, cooperation among peoples for the progress of humanity and concession of political asylum. As a single paragraph, the chart wants to assert Brazil’s interest in regional integration and the formation of a Latin American community of nations. Cordiality permeates several of these principles and has contributed to make Brazil a pacifist and democratic country that is committed to humanitarian law. At least in official terms.

The three d’s of Lula’s foreign policy

Lula da Silva’s foreign policy can be summarized, broadly, in the trinomial development, democracy and diversification, the latter taking at least two forms: seeking new economic-commercial partnerships and Brazil’s active participation in the construction of new international forums or, as the foreign ministry calls them, new regional mechanisms, such as IBSA, the commercial G20 and BRIC. Cordiality, as an element of national diplomacy, propels these directives, which are part of Brazil’s international identity.

Celso Lafer defined as elements of Brazil’s international identity: our neighborhood; Brazil’s insertion, as a medium-sized power on a continental scale, into the asymmetric axis of the international system; the Grotian constants in Brazilian foreign policy; and the search for development of ‘national space’ through nationalism of ends and diplomacy of controlled insertion in the world (LAFER, 2001). In this way, it converges with Amado Luiz Cervo and his concept of accumulated history, where development is present as a direction, as well as the Grotian principles (legalism, peaceful solution of controversies, self-determination) and the need for diversification.

Economic development, in Cervo’s view, became a Brazilian foreign policy direction in the 1930s and, with a few difficulties, such as the neoliberal wave of the 1990s, continues to this day. To Lafer, the 1930s Revolution was a true watershed in Brazilian political, economic and cultural history and led to deeper critical thinking about Brazilian nationalism, with the notion of Brazil as an underdeveloped country. This type of thinking gained strength in the 1950s and 1960s and was translated into the principle of autonomy in internal and foreign policy and into the perception that the principal function of Brazilian chancellery is to identify, on the international stage, which foreign resources may be mobilized to meet the internal development imperative. This process continued into the last few decades, moving from autonomy by distance (the country’s relative distancing in the 1970s) to autonomy by participation (multilateralism in the 1990s).

With respect to the asymmetric axis of the international system, I believe, with Gelson Fonseca Jr., that, if once the country was reasonably successful in building the possible autonomy through a relative distancing from the world, in this turn of the century this possible autonomy, necessary for development, can only be built through active participation in the creation of norms and guidelines of conduct for the management of the global order (LAFER, 2001, p. 117).

Despite Cervo and Lafer’s distinct perceptions about the nature and quality of the Cardoso and Lula da Silva administrations, perceptions that often clash – there is agreement on the Brazilian diplomatic tradition, its essential values and the conduct of Brazilian diplomacy. There is also agreement on the inevitability of globalization and a more active international insertion in it, on the values of democracy applied to the international game and the diversification of Brazil’s international ties.
Brazilian diplomacy, although interrupted during the country’s trajectory in the 20th century and questionable in its essential elements, was identified as a fundamental principle of Brazilian foreign policy by the diplomat and academic Alexandre Parola. In the work *A ordem injusta*, Parola proposes the concept of democratic pragmatism to define Lula da Silva’s foreign policy, “a policy that joins the promotion of values inspired by citizenship itself with the capacity to act in a non-dogmatic way in defense of national interests and the construction of a just order” (PAROLA, 2007, p. 30). The notion of order in international relations, as well as the concepts of power and justice, is, in this author’s view, essentially relational, for an order refers to relative positions within a system. The Brazilian criticism of the unjust international order is thus based on the concept of justice, because, for countries without a power surplus, a solid conceptual construction organized around values is an important instrument for diplomatic action.

The country’s socioeconomic development was the keynote of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s inauguration speech on January 1, 2003. The negotiations in the FTAA, Mercosur, with the European Union and in the multilateral and bilateral forums should reflect a concern with income elevation and job creation, expressed in more dynamic foreign trade, the acquisition of advanced technology and the search for productive investments. The main foreign policy directives should work towards attaining income and jobs for Brazilians. Among his various objectives, he stressed the fight against developed countries’ protectionism, democratization of international relations without any kind of hegemony and giving priority to South America and Mercosur by building integration, based on democratic and social justice ideals (LULA DA SILVA, 2003).

It could be understood from the speech that Brazil would seek a more central role in international relations, rejecting any kind of hegemony, based on democratic and social justice ideals, in a frank dialogue with the autonomist tradition of Brazilian foreign policy. Brazil presented itself as a power under construction, but different from the emerging developments or stronger action, there has been a change in the historical paradigms of Brazilian foreign policy, but rather identified the continuities more than the changes, although they recognized some important novelties. To Vigevani and Cepaluni based themselves on the systemic stability itself sized power with Brazil’s characteristics, but also for promoting the national interests of a middle-sized power Brazil’s characteristics, not just for promoting the national interests of a middle-sized power Brazil’s characteristics, but also for systemic stability itself (PAROLA, 2007, p. 422).

It was no accident that Lula da Silva, in his inauguration speech, referred to Brazil’s diplomatic action as guided by a humanist perspective, with its main objective being national development. In Parola’s view, a foreign policy guided by values and directed at building a more just international order must incorporate the defense of greater equality, must promote democracy’s role and cannot let go of the democratic state’s essential role as a mediator of tensions and disagreements. The democratic state is given the legitimacy and representativeness to speak in the name of society and defend values such as human rights, the environment and fighting crime. Lula da Silva, differently from Cardoso, incorporated democracy more firmly as a guiding principle of Brazilian foreign policy.

While Parola highlighted a fundamental change in Lula da Silva’s foreign policy, Tullo Vigevani and Gabriel Cepaluni identified the continuities more than the changes, although they recognized some important novelties. To Vigevani and Cepaluni, just as there has been no significant rupture with the historical paradigms of Brazilian foreign policy, but rather developments or stronger action, there has been a change in the emphasis given to certain options that had already been opened. Both governments, as representatives of distinct diplomatic traditions, had different actions, preferences and beliefs, but they sought not to distance themselves from the permanent objective; economic development, with political representativeness to speak in the name of society and defend values such as human rights, the environment and fighting crime. Lula da Silva, differently from Cardoso, incorporated democracy more firmly as a guiding principle of Brazilian foreign policy.

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Vigevani and Cepaluni based themselves on the hypothesis that, unlike the Cardoso administration – which had adopted the “autonomy by participation” idea, as opposed to the “autonomy by distance” of the last military presidents – the Lula da Silva administration tried to place Brazil on the world stage by stressing autonomous forms and diversifying partners and strategic options. The main characteristic of “autonomy by diversification” was (and is) emphasis on South-South cooperation, perceived as an instrument to diminish the country’s vulnerability in face of the great economies. In the authors’ words:
We synthetically define (...) autonomy by diversification as the country’s adhesion to international principles and norms via South-South alliances and agreements with non-traditional partners (China, Asia-Pacific, Africa, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, etc), because we believe that they reduce asymmetries in foreign relations with more powerful countries and increase our national negotiating capacity.

Vigevani and Cepaluni’s emphasis was on continuities, unlike Amado Luiz Cervo, who identified a substantial rupture between the 1990s and 2000s; the change from the neoliberal paradigm (or Normal State) to the logistical state paradigm. Cervo understands logistical state to be the political unit that preserves its decision-making autonomy, enters the world through interdependence and implements a post-developmental insertion model. Its final objective is overcoming asymmetries, elevating the national level to that of advanced nations (CERVO, 2008, p. 85-6). It is the state that takes up again the values of national developmentalism, incorporates neoliberal criticism to this and recognizes the strength of the globalized economy.

Thus, the three interpretations summarized above (CERVO-LAFER, PAROLA and VIGEVANI & CEPALUNI) can be called the three ‘d’s of Brazilian foreign policy – development, democracy and diversification. They refer to distinct dimensions of the country’s foreign policy: a) the industrialization and economic development objective, founded on the notions provided by political economy; b) the democratic principle as the guide of the country’s diplomatic action, in a Grotian or Neo-Grotian perspective; c) the strategies developed by the Lula da Silva administration, diversifying commercial partnerships and investment flows, in a somewhat functionalist view. The three views are useful for understanding current Brazilian foreign policy and reveal the emphasis often placed on international cooperation as an instrument for developing the country, multilateral negotiations, respect for international law and the diversification of the country’s interlocutors.

International cooperation: a cordial and solitary policy

Brazil’s international cooperation is one of the more visible ways of applying what Parola refers to as the construction of a fair order. The origins of international cooperation received by the country go back at least to the aftermath of the 2nd World War, when it was essentially directed at economic development projects. Later, as Brazil became one of the world’s major industrial economies, albeit a developing one, and opened up to the forces of globalization, it also became a provider of cooperation.

From the 1990s onwards, as well as receiving cooperation, Brazil began to provide cooperation at a growing pace, generally directed at Sub-Saharan African countries and Latin American neighbors. Cooperation became a fundamental instrument for Brazilian foreign policy, as Celso Amorim (FUNAG, 2007, p. 323) observed. When the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) joined the structural organization of the Foreign Relations Ministry, the Agency began to play a very important role in bringing Brazil closer to other countries, notably developing ones. Among the Agency’s most intense areas of activity, agriculture and education (literacy programs) stand out. These are responsible for 55% of the cooperation provided by the country, followed by training of technical staff, biofuels (ethanol and biodiesel), health (combat of HIV/AIDS), electoral support (electronic ballot boxes), and sport cooperation (soccer), among others. According to the Brazilian Chancellor, when offering cooperation opportunities, Brazil is not aiming at commercial gain or profit, or any other conditionality.

According to the ABC, the cooperation provided is based on values such as the new view of relations between developing countries, inspired in common interest and mutual help. These principles were present in the balance made at the end of 2005 by ambassador Ruy Nogueira, on the occasion of the G-77 High-Level Conference in Marrakesh, Morocco. The exposition of the main Brazilian initiatives highlighted a few areas, without intending to make an exhaustive list. Firstly, the initiatives in professional training were reported, that is, the professional qualification courses done in partnership with the National Industrial Learning Service, Senai. Several actions had already been performed in Angola, East Timor, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, and Paraguay (Hemandárias, in the region of Ciudad del Este). In the primary education area, Brazil had provided its experience in the structuring of the Bolsa-Escola (School Aid) and Alfabetização Solidária (Solidary Literacy) programs, the latter including literacy for young people and adults. Among the main beneficiaries were St. Thomas and Prince and Mozambique. In East Timor, the ABC supported, from 2002, the process of reintroducing the Portuguese language and fighting illiteracy. Central America, El Salvador and Guatemala received similar initiatives.

In the health area, where Brazilian technical cooperation has been in high demand, a relevant role has been occupied by the Saúde da Família (Family Health) programme. A theme that has been in growing demand from Latin American and African countries is the combat of sexually-transmitted diseases, particularly Aids. Various subprograms in this area operate in countries such as Guinea Bissau, Mozambique,
Angola, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Guatemala. Cuba and Botswana also received broad actions involving technology interchange for the diagnosis of HIV infection, qualification of technicians, program management, etc.

According to Ruy Nogueira, some technical cooperation projects seek to involve all countries interested in the region’s health matters, such as the Brazil-Peru-Colombia Tripartite Cooperation in Health. Its objective was to improve the general health conditions in the Amazon area shared by the three countries and threatened by diseases such as cholera, tuberculosis, malaria and yellow fever. For the same purpose, Brazil participates in the project Strengthening the Vigilance Capacity and Integrated Sanitary Control in Ports, Airports and Borders of the Brazil-Colombia Region. Another noteworthy area is infant mortality control, where there have been cooperation agreements with Angola and Paraguay, as well as Argentina and Uruguay.

In the food and agriculture area, one of the three most important areas in the cooperation provided by Brazil, the actions aimed to transfer the Brazilian experiences with tropical agriculture, introduction of new technologies for the improvement of products and search for greater productivity in rural labor. Various projects for cooperation in this area were created in countries in Latin America, Africa and East Timor (NOGUEIRA, 2009). In the ambassador’s view, Brazil still lacked human resources in order to aspire to greater expansion in the sector.

The absence of material interest on behalf of Brazil was the keynote of the speech given by ambassador Ruy Nunes Pinto Nogueira, General Undersecretary of Commercial Cooperation and Promotion, at an event held in Rio de Janeiro on October 8 and 9, 2009 (FUNAG/IPRI, 2009). Enthusiastic about the cooperation provided by Brazil, Nogueira clarified that, although Brazil received more cooperation than it provided, just during Lula’s administration 380 complementary adjustments had been signed, including programs in the health, agriculture, education, biofuels, development, computing and sports areas, among others. Brazilian solidarity was exemplified by the cooperation program with Algeria in the cardio-vascular surgery area, cooperation without self-interest, although Brazil sells medical equipment in this area.

Solidarity was also the sole motivation for the development of structuring projects such as the one in Haiti, involving actions that go from the creation of a model farm to mass vaccination against German measles. In the view of ambassador Gonçalo de Barros Carvalho e Mello Mourão, Director of the Foreign Relation Ministry’s Central America and Caribbean Department, the power Brazil presents in Haiti is not the power of weapons but rather of solidarity. However, he states that Brazil is not in Haiti to sell textiles, but that there is no problem in selling to them; and that the best way to leave Haiti – a reference to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (Minustah) – is to remain there. These are only apparent contradictions, for there is no cooperation without self-interests, even if it is indirect, and, in the Minustah case, stabilizing the country is a humanitarian objective that could indirectly contribute to Brazilian business in the Caribbean region.

The tension between interests and cooperation is not new in international relations and is certainly felt in another area of international cooperation, the cooperation between science and technology. At the same event mentioned above, ambassador Hadil da Rocha Vianna, Director of the Foreign Affairs Ministry’s Scientific and Technological Themes Department, displayed his satisfaction with the current level Brazil has reached in this area, although the country does not have a policy for technology transference and technology. Brazil is the 13th global power in terms of science and technology, with investments that reach 1.45% of GDP, against 3 to 4% in South Korea and 8% in China. In areas such as biotechnology, information technology, metal-mechanics and others, Brazil no longer accepts cooperative aid and prides itself of the fact that it can negotiate among equals, offering technical cooperation in exchange for technical cooperation.

The theme of provided cooperation is undoubtedly linked to the building of the nation’s image abroad – the image of a cordial power – and the use of soft power, albeit with a limited range. The increase in the cooperation provided by Brazil over the last decades has accompanied the country’s greater international presence, whether in the commercial area or as a capitals exporter. In this sense, Brazil’s opening to globalization, after the tough learning period of the 1980s, has allowed its foreign policy’s accumulated history to adapt to new times and new elements such as provided cooperation.

Brazil, a cordial power?

The discussion about whether a cordial power is possible presupposes the debate around the notion of power itself. One of the classic authors of realism, Hans Morgenthau, based himself on the idea of power applied to the individual – a man’s strength over the minds and actions of other men – to question what we mean when we attribute aspirations and actions to a nation (MORGENTHAU, 2003, p. 200). While identifying that not all nation’s citizens desires will be equal, Morgenthau recognizes modern nationalism as
one of the sources for constructing power and suggests geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, degree of military readiness, population, national morale (the most common qualities of intellect and temperament), national morale (the degree of determination with which a nation supports its government’s foreign policies in war or in peace), quality of diplomacy and quality of government as the constitutive elements of national power. Morgenthau had in mind the post-war United States and the construction of American power.

The complexity and sophistication of Morgenthau’s reasoning are greater than his critics portray. Quality of diplomacy, although it has an unstable nature, was ranked as the most important of all the factors involved in forming a nation’s power, with the presence of all other factors as a prerequisite:

The quality of a nation’s diplomacy combines these different factors into an integrated whole, gives them direction and weight, as well as awakening dormant possibilities by giving them the breath of real power. (...) It is a question (...) of the art of joining the different elements of national power, so as to make them produce the greatest possible effect on those points of the international situation that most directly affect national interests (MORGENTHAU, 2003, p. 273).

In the case of contemporary Brazil, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs never tires of praising, for example, during the negotiations for reform of the United Nations Security Council, the country’s power resources, especially geography, natural resources, population and quality of diplomacy. It is harder to argue for industrial capacity, degree of military preparation, national temperament, national morale and quality of government as the constitutive elements of Brazilian national power. The last aspect was already present in the ideas of San Tiago Dantas, when he proposed a foreign policy linked to deepening democracy and implementing social reform.

When taking Morgenthau’s analysis as a basis, Brazil and, with it, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, only go halfway. Quality of diplomacy cannot reach its optimal point when important power resources such as the ones mentioned above are lacking. Furthermore, if we add the contribution of the constructivists, for whom the interests and identities of states are largely constructed by their social structures, of an intersubjective nature, Brazil should be more concerned with national temperament and morale, along with quality of government, than with military readiness, although this is an essential source of power. In more modern times, it can be said that pacifism and democracy are important instruments for constructing a power and they are not incompatible with good military readiness. More importantly, however, is quality of government, that is, a government capable of promoting balance between material and human resources and the foreign policy to be implemented, of articulating the various available resources and obtaining popular support for foreign policy.

Popular support will be more consistent as foreign policy reflects values initially applied in the internal context, as, for example, social and economic development, democracy and its institutions, respect for society’s pluralism, cooperation between the various representations of national power (and society) and social inclusion. One of the greatest criticisms ever directed at Brazilian national power was made by Gerson Moura, when he pointed out the distance traditionally maintained between the formulation and the implementation of our foreign policy and the interests of society:

This worrying absence/distance/exclusion of the great majorities in the creation or, at least, in the discussion and vigilance of Brazilian foreign policy, is perhaps less the expression of the apathy of the masses in relation to international problems and much more the character of the leader-led relationship in the national historical experience. The specific competence of our political elites in the conduct of foreign policy, due to their international experience, displays a notable continuity in time: its excluding cosmopolitanism constitutes, on the plane of international relations, the modern face of a conservative heart. So it was, so it is and, by the looks of things, so it will be (MOURA, 1991, p. X).

How can an emerging power be cordial when it maintains our levels of illiteracy, poverty, violence and exclusion? Brazil has not yet reached the condition of being a power, but it can be said that it is in the process of constructing power. On this journey, the following elements are undeniable: the preservation of its foreign policy’s accumulated history, duly adapted to the international setting in this early 21st century; concerns with development, in its broader sense; the defense of democratic principles, both externally and internally; the diversification of the country’s international ties, often beyond doctrinaire barriers; the construction of soft power resources and, within it, the perfection of cooperation and cordiality. Cordiality, however, is form and not essence. It requires greater consistency in the other resources of power.
Bibliographic references


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